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How an Unfunded Pension System looks like Defined Benefits 
but works like Defined Contributions: The German Pension Reform 
 
Axel H. Börsch-Supan, Anette Reil-Held, and Christina B. Wilke 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper describes the German pension reform process since 1992 with a stress on a remark-
able development: the public pay-as-you-go-financed pension system has almost silently 
moved from a traditional defined benefit system to a system which works in many respects like 
a defined contribution system. 
Defined benefit systems have been an important achievement of social policy during the emer-
gence of modern welfare states. They provide workers with a reliable perspective on their re-
tirement income. They are, however, unsustainable if the balance between young contributors 
and older benefit recipients changes, e.g., due to earlier retirement ages, as they emerged since 
the 1970s in almost all industrialized countries, or due to population aging, which will double 
the number of beneficiaries per contributor during the next three decades. 
Defined contribution systems automatically react to these changes. In funded defined contribu-
tion systems, the rates of return and the conditions for annuitization are results of demand and 
supply on the capital markets. They are thus sustainable by design. However, they expose 
workers to types of risk modern societies have not yet adapted to. Capital markets are still 
volatile, and the risk of being underfunded at retirement – e.g., if a workers starts saving late or 
interrupts contributions due to unemployment or family events – is not a risk which we are well 
equipped to calculate. 
Pension reform is the art of finding a compromise between sustainability with respect to secu-
lar changes and stability of retirement income for the individual worker. There is a painful ten-
sion between these two goals as the preceding discussion of defined benefit and defined contri-
bution systems has shown. Any country embarking on pension reform, be it in Europe or in 
3 
Latin-America, has to make painful choices between these two basic principles.1 This paper 
describes the compromise that has been reached in Germany after a reform process that lasted 
15 years, hopefully with a few lessons that are useful also for other countries. 
Since pension systems reflect the social fabric of a country, the paper begins with a brief sum-
mary of the history of the German pension system (Section 2). Sections 3 through 7 describe 
the strategic steps in the reform process, marked by law changes and commission reports. Sec-
tion 8 shows a bit more formally the similarity between the new German system and the Swed-
ish national defined contribution system. Section 9 concludes. 
2. The evolution of the German system in a nutshell 
The German pension system, designed by Bismarck almost 120 years ago, was the first formal 
pension system in the world. It has been very successful in providing a high and reliable level 
of retirement income in the past at reasonable contribution rates, and it became a model for 
many social security systems around the world. 
As opposed to other countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which origi-
nally adopted a Beveridgian social security system that provided only a base pension, public 
pensions in Germany were from the start designed to extend the standard of living that was 
achieved during work life also to the time after retirement. Thus, public pensions are roughly 
proportional to labor income averaged over the entire life course and feature only few redis-
tributive properties. The German pension system is therefore called “retirement insurance” 
rather than “social security” as in the United States, and workers used to understand their con-
tributions as “insurance premia” rather than “taxes.”  
The insurance character is strengthened by institutional separation and the point system. The 
German retirement insurance system is not part of the government budget but a separate entity. 
This entity is subsidized by the federal government. Rationale for this subsidy—which comes 
to about 30 percent of expenditures—are noninsurance benefits, such as benefits paid to Ger-
man immigrants after opening the iron curtain. Any surplus, however, remains in the system. It 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) or Valdés-Prieto (1998) for the Latin American experience, Fox and Palmer 
(1999) for the Latvian experience. 
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is not transferable into a “unified budget” as in the United States.2 The point system, similar to 
the French system, relates benefits to the number of years contributed and the relative earnings 
position in each of these years. Workers who contribute longer to the public system receive a 
proportionally higher pension. Moreover, pensions are proportional to the amount contributed. 
This feature is important because it represents a crucial element of a defined contribution sys-
tem.3 
The German retirement insurance started as a fully funded system with a mandatory retirement 
age of 70 years when male life expectancy at birth was less than 45 years. Today, life expec-
tancy for men is more than 75 years but average retirement age is about 61 years. The system 
converted to a de facto pay-as-you-go system when most funds were invested in government 
bonds between the two world wars. After a long and arduous debate, the German Bundestag 
decided in 1957 to convert the system gradually to a pay-as-you-go scheme. The remainder of 
the capital stock was spent about 10 years later. Since then, the German system is purely pay-
as-you-go with a very small reserve fund lasting less than 14 days of expenditures in Spring 
2004. 
A second historical reform took place in 1972. It made the German pension system one of the 
most generous of the world. The retirement behavior visible in current data is mainly influ-
enced by the reform. The 1972 system is generous in two respects. First, the system has a high 
replacement rate, generating net retirement incomes that are currently about 70 percent of pre-
retirement net earnings for a worker with a 45-year earnings history and average lifetime earn-
ings.4 This is substantially higher than, for example, the corresponding U.S. net replacement 
rate of about 53 percent.5 The high initial level of public pensions was exacerbated by indexa-
tion to gross wages. Second, the 1972 reform abolished the mandatory retirement age of 65 
years for those with a long service life6 in favor of a flexible choice during a “window of re-
                                                 
2 See Gruber and Wise (2004). 
3 See Bäcker et al. (2000) 
4 This replacement rate is defined as the current pension of a retiree with a 45-year average earnings history di-
vided by the current average earnings of all dependently employed workers. It is different from the replacement 
rate relative to the most recent earnings of a retiring worker, which are usually higher than the life-time average.  
5 This figure is arrived at using the same replacement rate concept as in endnote 2.  
6 At least 35 years. 
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tirement” between age 63 and 65, with no actuarial adjustments. Adding to these very generous 
early retirement provisions were easy ways to claim disability benefits and low mandatory re-
tirement ages for women and unemployed persons, further increasing the number of beneficiar-
ies and extending the “window of retirement” to between 60 and 65. 
It is no surprise that the German public pension system is the single largest item in the German 
social budget. In the year 2001, public pension expenditures amounted to some 200 billion eu-
ros, representing 21 percent of public spending and 11.8 percent of GDP. It is the second larg-
est pension budget in the OECD, surpassed only by Italy (at 14.2 percent of GDP). It is more 
than 2.5 times as expensive as the U.S. social security system (which is 4.4 percent of GDP).7 
The generosity of the German public pension system is considered a great social achievement, 
but negative incentive effects and population aging are threatening its very core.8 Although 
incentive effects are still arcane in the eyes of politicians and the electorate, population aging 
has become a “megatrend” in the popular debate. All industrialized countries are aging, but 
Germany—together with Italy and Japan—will experience a particularly dramatic change in 
the age structure of the population. The severity of the demographic transition has two causes: 
a quicker increase in life expectancy than elsewhere, partly because of the still relatively low 
level in the 1970s, and a more incisive baby boom/baby bust transition (than the United States, 
for example) to a very low fertility rate of 1.3 children per woman, only a bit higher than the 
rock-bottom fertility rate of 1.2 in Italy and Spain. Consequently, the ratio of elderly to work-
ing-age persons—the old-age dependency ratio—will increase steeply. According to the latest 
OECD projections, the share of elderly (aged 65 and above) will exceed a quarter of the popu-
lation in 2030, and the German old-age dependency ratio will almost double, from 24.0 percent 
in 2000 to 43.3 percent in 20309. 
The increase in the dependency ratio has immediate consequences for a pay-as-you-go social 
insurance system because fewer workers have to finance the benefits of more recipients. The 
German social security contribution rate, which in 2003 was 19.5 percent of gross income, was 
                                                 
7 See OECD (2001). 
8 See Börsch-Supan (2000). 
9 See OECD (2001). The OECD dependency ratio relates persons age 65 and older to persons between ages 15 
and 64. 
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projected at the end of the 1980s to exceed 40 percent of gross income at the peak of popula-
tion aging in 2035 if the accustomed replacement rates and the indication of pensions to gross 
income were maintained.10 This led to a 15-year-lasting pension reform process, starting with 
the 1992 reform, culminating in the reform agenda of the “Sustainability Commission” in 
2003, and ending – at least for the time being – in 2007, when the last proposal of this agenda 
was made to law.  
The reform process transformed the German public pay-as-you-go pillar in a system that works 
very much like the Swedish notional defined contribution (NDC) system, but is still in the form 
of a defined benefit system. The following sections describe these reforms and their strategic 
steps. It should be noted that these reforms were not master-minded; just the opposite, some 
“happened” due to budget crises and new political constellations. From hindsight, however, the 
strategic steps follow, maybe astoundingly, a rather consistent red threat. 
3.  The 1992 Reform 
The first main change of the 1992 reform was to anchor benefits to net rather than to gross 
wages. This implicitly has reduced benefits since taxes and social security contributions have 
increased, reducing net relative to gross wages. While this mechanism was modified several 
times between 1998 and 2001 and today no longer includes taxes, the important link to social 
security contributions has been preserved. It will become particularly important when popula-
tion aging speeds up, since it implies an implicit mechanism of burden sharing between genera-
tions.11 
The second important element in the 1992 reform was the introduction of “actuarial” adjust-
ments to benefits to retirement age. These changes will reduce incentives to retire early and are 
an important first strategic steps towards making the system more alike a defined contribution 
system since benefits now depend on the date of retirement in an actuarial fashion. 
The introduction of benefit adjustments to retirement age in Germany mimics the automatic 
benefit adjustments within an NDC system approach, where benefits are adjusted to retirement 
age by the annuity formula. However, in contrast to an NDC system, the adjustments in the 
                                                 
10 See Prognos (1987).  
11 See Schnabel (1998). 
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German system have been set discretionarily and are not directly linked to changes in life ex-
pectancy. They are about 1.5 percentage points lower than current life tables and a 3 percent 
discount rate would imply.12 
4.  The 1999 Reform 
It became quickly clear that the 1992 reform was too little and too late to put the German sys-
tem on a stable and sustainable path. In 1999, a new pension reform attempt was supposed to 
lower the replacement rate according to a prespecified “demographic factor”—a function of 
life expectancy plus several correction factors. However, the reform was revoked after the con-
servative government lost elections in 1998, and the new social-democratic government, 
strongly supported by the unions, fulfilled its election promises not to touch pension benefits. 
A side effect of this reform, which was not revoked, was a gradual change of eligibility ages 
for pensions for women and unemployed persons from age 60 to age 65. This change will be 
fully implemented by 2017 and effectively leaves a “window of retirement” for healthy work-
ers only if they have at least 35 years of service. Moreover, there will be no distinction between 
men and women (after the year 2015); unemployment-retirement will be abolished (after the 
year 2007); and part-time retirement (which was largely taken in two “blocks” of full-work and 
subsequent full-retirement) will be impossible (after the year 2007). These changes were 
largely unnoticed by the population. They will change the effective retirement age by around 2 
years from about age 60 to age 62.13 
5.  The Riester Reform in 2001 
Not touching pension benefits was easier said than done. The financial situation of the pension 
system worsened rather quickly after the 1998 elections that brought the social democrats to 
power in Germany. As a remarkable irony in politics, the former union leader then secretary of 
labor Walter Riester successfully passed a major reform bill through parliament in 2001. 
The 2001 reform is popularly referred to as the Riester reform. It is a major change in the sys-
tem. It will change the monolithic German system of old-age provision to a genuine multipillar 
                                                 
12 Actuarial computations depend on a discount or interest rate which makes payments made or received at differ-
ent points in time commensurable. Usually, a rate of 3 percent is assumed, sometimes 4 or 5 percent. The German 
computations rest on a discount rate of about 1 percent. 
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system. The most important aspect of the reform, which came into effect on January 1, 2002, is 
a partial substitution of pay-as-you-go financed pensions by funded pensions.14 The reform 
aimed to achieve three main objectives: 
• Sustainable contribution rates. The key objective of the Riester reform was to stabilize 
contribution rates and thus (1) to limit further increases in nonwage labor costs and (2) to 
achieve a fairer balance of intergenerational burdens. The law actually states that contribu-
tion rates to the public retirement insurance scheme must stay below 20 percent until 2020 
and below 22 percent until 2030 while the net replacement rate must stay above 67 per-
cent. Failure must precipitate government action. 
• Secure the long-term stability of pension levels. Pensions will be gradually reduced 
from the current level of 70 percent of average net earnings to around 67–68 percent by the 
year 2030. At the same time, however, the Riester reform changed the computational pro-
cedure for the reference earnings, now subtracting a fictitious 4 percent of gross earning to 
be invested into the new funded supplementary private pensions. This differs from the de-
finition of net earnings that applied prior to the reform, as it means that actual PAYG pen-
sion levels will fall by a larger margin (by some 10 percent to about 63.5 percent) than 
suggested by the new definition.  
• Spread of supplementary private pension savings. The decline in public pensions is 
expected to be offset by supplementary (occupational and private) pensions. In order to 
achieve this aim, supplementary pensions are subsidized, either by tax deferral and tax de-
duction, or by direct subsidies to individual and occupational pension plans. These 
supplementary pensions are, however, not mandated. 
Table 1 gives an overview over the main changes: 
                                                                                                                                                          
13 See the projections on the change of retirement age by Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2004). 
14 See Bonin (2001). 
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Table 1. Key Elements of the Riester Reform 
Introduction of a needs-
oriented basic income 
Minimum social security guarantee for old age; reduction in earning 
capacity secured by means of needs-oriented basic income 
New adjustment formula Reduction in pension level by about 10 percent 
Abolition of occupational 
incapacity pensions 
Discontinuation of occupational incapacity pensions; replacement by 
two-tier general invalidity pension 
Reform of women’s and 
survivors’ pensions 
Modification of income rules for survivors’ pensions; introduction of 
“pension splitting for married couples” 
Reformed framework for 
occupational pensions 
Introduction of a legal right to convert salary into pension contributions; 
relaxation of investing rules; introduction of pension funds; DC plans 
permitted 
Establishment of funded 
(voluntary) supplementary 
pension provision 
Introduction of individual retirement accounts; rules for the recognition 
of financial services products eligible for state subsidies (Retirement 
Pension Contracts Certification Act); provision of state subsidy; intro-
duction of deferred taxation 
Source: Authors compilation. 
Since the Riester reform is a crucial step in the 15-year reform process, we will explain these 
reform elements in more detail in the following four subsections, and the provide a brief as-
sessment of the Riester reform. 
5.1  The PAYG Pillar: Reducing the Replacement Rate 
The calculation of the current monthly pension value for a specific year takes account of the 
development of the earnings of all workers. This procedure is intended to guarantee that the 
“standard pension replacement rate” remains stable and does not fall behind the development 
of current average earnings.15  Before the 2001 reform, the objective of safeguarding standards 
of living in old age was considered to be met if pensions were worth 70 percent of average net 
earnings. Thus the pension level more than maintained the purchasing power of the level of 
pension entitlements acquired when a person retires. Until the 2001 reform, the German pen-
sion system was essentially run by adapting the contribution rate to this 70 percent standard 
replacement rate. 
                                                 
15 The reader is reminded that the term replacement rate may be misleading. In the German context, it does NOT 
refer to last earnings before retirement. Rather, the “standard replacement rate” refers to the pension of a worker, 
who had 45 earnings points, divided by the average net earnings off all current workers. 
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The Riester reform introduced a rather complex new adjustment formula, which relates 
changes in the pension value (PVt) to lagged changes in gross income (AGIt), modified by the 
actual contribution rate to public pensions (τt) and a fictitious contribution rate to the new pri-
vate pension accounts (AVAt), gradually increasing from 0.5 percent in 2003 to 4 percent in 
2009. In addition, a somewhat awkward “sensitivity factor” dt was introduced. It is 100 until 
2010, then decreases to 90, which effectively increases the sensitivity of PV to increases in τ 
after 2010. It thus simply reduces the replacement rate after 2010:  
 .
100
100
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2
1
1
−−
−−
−
−
−
−−
−−
=
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The complex design of the formula reflects the balance between the two opposing aims of the 
reform: to keep the contribution rate below a fixed level (20 percent until 2020, 22 percent un-
til 2030), and to keep the redefined standard replacement level above 67 percent until 2030. 
Both conflicting aims are part of the German pension law. If any of these aims are violated, the 
law precipitates government action, such as the introduction of the reform commission in 2003. 
The awkward jump in the sensitivity factor dt reflects the aim to mimic the speed of demo-
graphic change: the system dependency ratio will stay relatively flat until 2010 and will then 
quickly rise. 
5.2  The New Funded Pillar: Introducing Supplementary Funded Pensions 
A crucial component of the Riester reform was the introduction and significant promotion of 
supplementary funded private pensions to fill the pension gap created by the reduction of the 
replacement rate. The objective is to offer incentives for people to take out supplementary pri-
vate pension cover that, in the long term, should compensate for the future cuts in public pen-
sions. However, there will be no legal mandate for people to invest in additional private 
schemes. These so-called Riester pensions can be occupational or individual pensions. 
On the one hand, Riester pensions are heavily subsidized to incentivate households to build up 
retirement savings. The incentives provided by the state can take two forms: direct savings 
subsidies and tax-deductible special allowances if they give an additional advantage. 
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On the other hand, Riester pensions have been heavily regulated. The main restriction on the 
demand side is on payment plans. Since additional private pension schemes are intended to 
supplement or replace benefits from the public pension scheme, the government decided that 
incentives will be available only for investment vehicles that guarantee payment of a life annu-
ity payable from the date of retirement. Investment vehicles that provide for lump-sum dis-
bursements are not subject to state subsidies.16 This restriction has already met with consider-
able criticism in the public debate as it excludes other forms of provision for old age (such as 
investments in old-age or nursing homes). 
The initial regulation of suppliers was also stringent, although it has been dramatically loos-
ened after the Sustainability Commission’s proposals, see below. Individual retirement ac-
counts qualify for state promotion only if they meet criteria laid down in the new Certification 
of Retirement Pension Contracts Act (AltZertG). Qualifying pension plans require certification 
by the Federal Financial Markets Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungs- und Fi-
nanzmarktaufsicht), which will be granted automatically if they fulfill the following precondi-
tions: 
1. Pension benefits may be paid out only when the beneficiary reaches the age of 60 at the 
earliest or upon reaching retirement age, unisex rates have to ensure equal treatment of 
men and women and the possibility to extend benefits to survivor and invalidity benefits 
must be provided. 
2. At the beginning of the disbursement phase, the accrued pension contributions (inclusive 
of subsidies) must be guaranteed (that is, the nominal rate of return must be nonnegative). 
3. Pension payments must be in the form of a life annuity or a disbursement plan linked to 
lifelong periodic installments with an initial lump-sum payment (up to 30% of the accumu-
lated capital). 
4. Initial commission and administrative charges must be spread equally over a period of at 
least 5 years. 
                                                 
16 If a lump-sum payment is chosen, all subsidies have to be reimbursed to the tax authorities. 
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5. The investor must have the right to suspend contributions during the saving phase, to allow 
the policy to continue running without making additional contributions, to switch policies, 
to withdraw capital in order to finance privately owned housing or to terminate the policy. 
Products eligible for subsidy support and into which old-age pension contributions and the pro-
ceeds on such contributions may be invested include pension insurance and capitalization 
products, bank accounts with accumulated interest, and shares in growth and distributing in-
vestment funds. These products are offered by life insurance companies, banks, capital invest-
ment companies, financial services institutions, and securities services companies. 
Contributions to Riester pensions are tax exempt during the saving phase, pension payments 
during the benefit phase, however, will be taxed in full as normal income. This applies to all 
benefits regardless of whether these accrue from contributions, subsidies, or capital gains. One 
may regard this as another form of subsidy, since taxes occur later in life (hence, an implicit 
tax credit) and usually at a lower rate due to progressivity.17 
5.3  State Promotion of Occupational Pension Schemes 
The Riester reform remained largely inexplicit on the role of occupational pensions versus in-
dividual accounts. Occupational pensions have traditionally played a minor role in Germany, 
particularly in comparison with other countries. Demand for participation in occupational pen-
sion schemes has also been falling in recent years.18 On the other hand, occupational pensions 
may provide a psychological substitute for mandated private pensions. In order to strengthen 
occupational pensions, additional (implicit and explicit) subsidies were introduced with the 
Riester reform. 
The most important change in occupational pensions resulting from the Riester reform is the 
general right of workers to convert part of their salary directly into contributions to pension 
plans. This applies regardless of whether the contributions are paid by the employer or the em-
ployee. Arrangements may be based both on gross and net pay. If they are based on net pay, 
there is a large implicit subsidy since the so-converted salary may not only be subject to de-
ferred taxation but can also be exempt from social security contributions, at least until 2008. If 
                                                 
17 See Börsch-Supan and Lührmann (2000). The “tax credit” feature depends on the an income or consumption tax 
point of view. 
18 See Ruppert (2000). 
13 
they are based on gross pay, contributions may enjoy the same direct subsidies or tax relief as 
contributions to individual accounts, as long as the occupational pensions meet certain criteria 
that are less restrictive than the criteria for individual pension plans. Which contribution rules 
apply depends on the chosen investment vehicle and the incentives they attract. Collective bar-
gaining agreements, however, have precedence over the right to convert salary. This means that 
an employee covered by a binding collective agreement is entitled to convert his or her pay into 
pension only if this is explicitly provided for in the terms of the collective agreement. This rule 
ensures that employers and unions can impose their own rules on occupational pension plans. 
5.4  The Minimum Pension 
An important element of the Riester reform was a minimum social security guarantee for old 
age and those, whose earning capacity is reduced. This is effectively a means-tested minimum 
pension, 15 percent higher than the German basic income (social assistance). It effectively 
shields workers in the lowest income deciles from the benefit cuts by the Riester reform. Ri-
ester pensions, however, will be counted in the means-testing procedure which creates negative 
incentives to participate in spite of very high subsidies to these savings for low wage earners. 
5.5 An Assessment of the Riester Reform 
The Riester reform, heralded in 2002 as “pension reform of the century”, was certainly a major 
reform of the German pension system. Its success, however, rests on whether the new volun-
tary supplementary private pensions, the “Riester pensions,” will be accepted by the German 
workers who were used to the all-caring public pay-as-you-go system. It is important to realize 
that this takes time. It took about 5 years to popularize a general subsidized dedicated savings 
program (Vermögenswirksame Leistungen, directly deducted from payroll), which now enjoys 
almost universal participation. In the United States, individual retirement accounts (IRAs) 
needed at least as long to be accepted by a large share of households. In this subsection, we 
look at the Riester pension’s design and the incentives in order to understand who is likely to 
take it up and who is not, and then compare it to the actual uptake. 
The depth of Riester incentives. Two aspects need to be considered when assessing the bene-
fits offered by Riester incentives: the subsidies/tax exemptions during the contribution phase 
and any tax-related advantages or disadvantages that arise during the disbursement phase. The 
direct subsidies during the contribution phase are very deep for those who have relatively low 
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incomes and those who have children. The reverse is the case for the tax-deductible special 
allowances, due to the progressive tax system. Here, households with higher incomes benefit 
more. This results in a U-shaped relation between subsidies and income.19 For lowest-income 
households, the subsidy is almost as large as the contribution itself. Even for the well-to-do, 
subsidy rates are high: around 40–50 percent. Given these deep subsidies, uptake is likely to be 
high. This U-shaped curve is flattened out during the disbursement phase when pension bene-
fits will be taxed. This flattening effect is due to the impact of progressive taxation. Taxation 
will not affect pensioners in the lower half of the income distribution because their pension 
income is below a generous exemption for retired households. It will, however, considerably 
reduce the effective lifetime subsidy to households with incomes above average. 
The form of the Riester incentives.  Although the depth of the Riester incentives makes the 
Riester pensions rather attractive, the Riester pension is less flexible than other retirement in-
vestment products. One of the main drawbacks is that most of the capital has to be annuitized 
and can therefore not be used as collateral or bequeathed. The argument lacks a certain logic 
since the very objective of the Riester pensions is to provide annuity income in order to fill the 
pension gap emerging from the reduced PAYG pillar. In our opinion, the widely voiced argu-
ment is a clear indication that most workers have not yet realized that they will depend on the 
Riester pensions for a reasonable retirement income. 
The extensive certification requirements that severely restrict the scope of private providers to 
develop new private insurance products and that lead to higher costs is also disadvantageous. 
Certain cost items can result in total costs of up to 20 percent, compared with around 10 per-
cent for a normal capital sum life insurance policy.20 
What is more, the certification rules serve merely to create a formal product standard without 
creating the transparency needed to compare different investment vehicles and the relative rates 
of return they offer. As a result, customers are often not in a position to make truly informed 
private investment decisions. The guarantee of the nominal value of contributions does ensure 
that, on retirement, at the very least the nominal capital saved is available as pension capital. 
However, there are no rules that prescribe the sort of pension dynamization that is needed to 
                                                 
19 We use the word subsidy for both the direct subsidy and the tax-deductible special allowance. 
20 See Stiftung Warentest (2002). 
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ensure that the value of pension benefits paid out from the saved capital can be maintained over 
the long term. Nondynamized Riester benefits will very quickly lose their value, even at very 
modest rates of inflation. 
Preliminary evidence on take-up rates. First survey results showed that the demand for Ri-
ester products was very sluggish: only around 9 percent had actually taken out a policy by mid 
2002, and not much changed until 2004. This led to some disillusion among policy makers. 
Recent figures, however, show a very steep increase in uptake rates. Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held 
und Schunk (2006), using the SAVE panel data on German households’ saving behaviour, 
show that demand for Riester products doubled in 2004 and again in 2005. The uptake rate end 
of 2005 exceeded 20 percent of all employees who also belong to the first pillar of the German 
pension system, the primary target population of the Riester reform. 2006 appears to be another 
year of a steep increase. 
In addition, there is a growing trend for workers to enroll in supplementary pension plans. Only 
around half of those planning to enroll in such plans are considering doing so in the framework 
of a Riester policy. The other half prefer other savings and insurance products, and/or occupa-
tional pensions.21 
Extrapolating the above dynamics and using the coverage reported in Börsch-Supan, Essig und 
Wilke (2005), about 80 percent of all households, in which at least one person is enrolled in the 
first pillar public pension system, are covered by a second and/or third pillar pension. 
On average and even at the median, the accumulated funds are sufficiently large to offset the 
cuts in the first pillar. For the less well to do, however, this is not the case. 
Moreover, many households, especially in the higher income brackets, may merely restructure 
their existing pension plans in order to reap Riester subsidies. At this point we do not have 
much hard evidence on such substitution. Should these households have a fixed pension target, 
financing state subsidies via general taxation can actually have perverse effects that lead to a 
lower savings rate.22 
                                                 
21 See Leinert (2003).  
22 See Börsch-Supan and Lührmann (2000). 
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Given successful take-up, as indicated by the recent evidence, the future composition of re-
tirement income will be quite different from the current monolithic one. While the German 
PAYG system will remain the dominant pillar for old-age provision, Riester pensions will 
make up about 35 percent of state organized retirement income. Should other income sources 
(currently about 15 percent of total retirement income) stay as they are, this would yield a share 
of PAYG pensions in total retirement income at about 55 to 60 percent. Some crowding out of 
existing occupational pensions and other private pensions by the new Riester pensions is likely, 
however, as mentioned earlier. 
6.  New Efforts: The 2003 Proposals by the Sustainability-Commission 
When it became obvious that the Riester reform measures would not suffice to meet the contri-
bution rate and pension level targets, a new reform commission, the “Commission for Sustain-
ability in Financing the German Social Insurance Systems”, popularly referred to as the Rürup 
commission after its chairman, Bert Rürup, was established in November 2002.23 Its twin ob-
jectives are those of the Riester reform: to stabilize contribution rates while at the same time 
ensuring appropriate future pension levels. 
The Rürup commission met in 2003 very different circumstances than Riester faced in 2001. 
Unexpectedly high unemployment rates and the poor performance of the German economy 
with extremely low growth rates precipitated a short-run financial crisis of the pension system 
and created a sense of urgency for reform. Moreover, the electorate became increasingly aware 
that stabilizing social security contributions in total labor compensation is essential for enhanc-
ing future growth. This paradigm shift away from thinking in pension claims toward thinking 
in financing possibilities had a noticeable impact on the commission’s reform proposals. 
In addition, the commission profited from the fact that the Riester reform had already paved the 
way for a more forceful shift from pay-as-you-go financed first-pillar pensions to funded sec-
ond- and third-pillar pensions. 
The reform proposal, published at the end of August 2003, comprises two major elements plus 
several accompanying measures. The first main element is a gradual increase of the normal 
                                                 
23 The commission was in charge of making reform proposals for the pension system, health care, and long-term 
care insurance. We only refer to the proposals of the pension group which was chaired by the first author of this 
paper. 
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retirement age from 65 to 67 years; the second is a modification of the pension benefit indexa-
tion formula linking benefits to the system dependency ratio. The first element is accompanied 
by adjustments to the various early retirement ages, and the second element is accompanied by 
a revision of the Riester pension regulations. Although the main two elements directly serve to 
achieve the desired stabilization of contribution rates, the accompanying measures keep the 
system of pathways to retirement balanced and address some of the widely criticized aspects of 
the newly introduced second- and third-pillar pensions. 
Increase of the normal retirement age. The commission proposes to increase the normal re-
tirement age from 65 to 67 years. The increase is slow and gradual, starting in 2011 with 
monthly steps such that age 67 will be reached in 2035. This increase corresponds to two-thirds 
of the projected change in life expectancy at age 65. 
In order to prevent substitution into early retirement and disability pensions as a result of the 
increase in the retirement age, the commission also proposed to increase the early retirement 
ages (to the same extent and on the same schedule as the normal retirement age) and to in-
crease the actuarial adjustments for disabled and long-term insured workers. Since there were 
additional worries about the coverage for workers subject to extreme physical wear and tear 
due to long years of hard work, a new pension type was proposed to make it possible for work-
ers with a service life of at least 45 years to retire two years earlier, however, with additional 
actuarial adjustments. 
Change of the benefit indexation formula: The “sustainability factor.”  The commission 
proposes to extend the Riester benefit indexation formula by a new factor, the sustainability 
factor. This factor reflects the development of the relative number of contributors to pension-
ers, the system dependency ratio, which is the most important long-term determinant of pen-
sion financing.24 The new pension formula looks as follows: 
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24 Strictly speaking, the sustainability factor will link benefits to the “equivalized system dependency ratio” in 
order to avoid distortions created by extremely low contributions and/or pension benefits. This ratio standardizes 
the number of pensioners by converting standard pensions into the number of “equivalence pensioners”. The 
number of “equivalence contributors” is likewise calculated by standardizing the average earner. 
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                          where PQ = [pensioners / (contributors + unemployed)] 
                          Note: The lags are due to data availability. 
It includes the sustainability factor in the inner brackets, weighted by α, and replaces the one-
time shift in the somewhat awkward “sensitivity parameter” dt (see the earlier section on the 
Riester reform If α = 0, the current Riester pension adjustment formula would remain un-
changed. If α = 1, the new indexation formula would imply a purely income-oriented pension 
benefit adjustment policy. The commission set the value of α at 0.25 , thereby fulfilling the 
Riester objectives of keeping the contribution rate under 20 percent until 2020 and under 22 
percent until 2030. 
The new pension formula will lead to further decreases in pension benefit levels vis-à-vis the 
path planned by the Riester reform  In contrast to the proposed demography factor in the failed 
1999 reform attempt, the sustainability factor considers not only the development of life expec-
tancy but also the entire demographic development (including changes in migration and nota-
bly in birth rates), as well as the development of the labor market. This is important as the in-
evitable reduction of the working-age population can be compensated by a higher labor force 
participation of women and elderly workers. The introduction of the sustainability factor thus 
allows directly linking pension adjustments to the crucial factors determining pension financ-
ing—namely, the number of contributors and benefit recipients. In doing this, the sustainability 
factor incorporates a self-stabilizing feedback mechanism into the system similar to the no-
tional rate-of-return mechanism in NDC systems, see below.25 
Higher second- and third-pillar pensions would compensate for this decrease. Since the uptake 
of the funded supplementary Riester pension has been modest so far in the very beginning of 
this program, the commission proposed a host of administrative changes to occupational and 
private pensions to make the system easier to handle and thus more popular. Among these are 
the expansion of the group of entitled persons to all tax payers, dynamic pension benefits, and 
increased transparency in the private pension provision. These administrative changes accom-
pany the proposed introduction of an exempt-exempt-taxed regime of ex post taxation. The 
steep rise in uptake described earlier is a clear indication that these measures were quite suc-
cessful. 
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7.  Realization: The 2004 and 2007 Reforms 
Most of the Rürup proposals, and most significantly the introduction of the sustainability fac-
tor, were quickly passed by the German parliament on March 31, 2004. The shift in the retire-
ment age, however, was not legislated. Since the commission proposed that the phasing-in pe-
riod should start in 2011, it was decided that there was no need for immediate legislative ac-
tion. Moreover, unions heavily opposed this adaptation of retirement age to life expectancy. 
Two years later, with population aging high on the political agenda, the government changed 
its mind and announced a gradual increase from 65 to 67 years, being fully effective in 2019. 
The re-enactment of the Commission’s proposal and the acceleration of the originally proposed 
schedule is was considered a bold move since the politics of shifting the retirement age are 
clearly not favorable. According to survey results by Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001, 
2002 and 2004), raising the retirement age is one of the most unpopular pension reform options 
in Germany. An interesting result of this survey is that this option is particularly unpopular 
among those who are least informed about the costs of the current pension system. Hence, 
while early retirement is a well appreciated social achievement among Germans, awareness of 
the costs of early retirement may moderate the opposition to increasing the retirement age. 
Another lesson from this survey is that the success of a reform depends on the flexibility in the 
hard choice between a later retirement age and a lower pay-as-you-go pension level, supple-
mented by private pensions that cut into consumption. As long as pensions are calculated in an 
actuarially neutral fashion, taking all side effects to the economy into account, there is no need 
for a “normal retirement age,” and workers can decide themselves between working longer and 
saving more. The recent experience in the United States in the aftermath of the bubble burst 
appears to indicate that workers are quite aware of this substitution. Flexibility minimizes the 
opposition to reform proposals relative to proposals that make cuts in only one direction—say, 
increasing the normal retirement age.  
The German Bundestag has passed this highly debated reform in the Spring of 2007, but only 
after introducing an array of escape clauses that will diminish the effect on the effective retire-
                                                                                                                                                          
25 See Börsch-Supan (2006). 
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ment age. Most importantly, the new pension type for workers with 45 years of service was 
introduced without the actuarial adjustments proposed by the Commission. 
Moreover, as pointed out before, the actuarial adjustments in the German system are not actu-
arially neutral from the point of view of workers who decide about their retirement age.26 As 
much as the government was slow and cautious to legislate the prospective increase in retire-
ment age, it did not touch the current lack of actuarial neutrality. Interestingly, introducing ac-
tuarial neutrality has also been opposed by the employers’ union, since it increases the costs of 
severance. 
8.  The “Quasi Notional Defined Contribution System” 
To see, why the set of the reforms described in the preceding five sections have converted the 
German system essentially into a notional contribution system, without loosing the politically 
much liked terminology and rhetoric of a defined benefit system, can be seen as follows. 
Stripped down to its economic essence, three mechanisms are the crucial ingredients which 
turn a defined benefit (DB) pay-as-you-go system into a notional defined contribution (NDC) 
system: 
(1) An accounting mechanism that credits all life-time earnings 
(2) A mechanism linking the final balance to the demographic and macroeconomic 
environment 
(3) An actuarial rule converting the final balance into an annuity. 
As opposed to funded (or financial) defined contribution (DC) plans, however, claims on future 
benefits in notional DC systems are not collaterized by real capital but rest on government 
promises. 
The first mechanism is realized in NDC systems by crediting all life-time contributions to an 
individual account, just like funded DC plans. This parallels in many respects the German and 
French point systems, except that the unit of credit is currency (Euro), not earnings points. 
These systems substantially differ from pension systems in which only the x best years are 
credited (at the extreme, only last year’s earnings), and from Beveridgian systems that provide 
flat benefits (e.g., in the UK and the Netherlands). Nonetheless, there is nothing intrinsic in DB 
                                                 
26 See Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999) and Börsch-Supan et al. (2004).  
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systems which prevents them from linking benefits to all life-time earnings. 
The second mechanism is realized in NDC systems by the notional interest rate. In a funded 
system, the internal rate of return is r, the market rate of interest. In a PAYG system, the 
theoretical internal rate of return is n+g, where n is the rate of growth of the contribution base, 
and g the growth rate of labor productivity. In reality, most PAYG-DB systems have a 
systemic indexation linking benefits at retirement to the current wage level, thereby taking 
account of labor productivity g. Demography, however, usually enters through discretionary 
adaptations of the replacement rate to demographic changes (thereby taking account of n). One 
of the main features of NDC systems is the direct and automatic linkage to both wages and 
demography if the notional interest rate corresponds to the growth rate of the contribution base. 
In the Swedish NDC system, however, the government chose g as the notional rate of interest, 
leaving out a direct link of accruing interest to demography.27  In an aging population, n+g 
tends to be smaller than g since n is negative, and it is in most circumstances much smaller 
than r. 
In turn, the German DB system after the 2004 reform indexes benefits to earnings growth and 
changes in the system dependency ratio via the so-called “sustainability factor”.28 This ap-
proximates the effect of the accumulated interest in a NDC system, in which the internal rate of 
interest is the growth rate of the contribution bill (1+n)*(1+g). This is easy to see in the styl-
ized case when all contributions (normalized to one unit) are credited upfront. In this stylized 
NDC case the notional pension wealth after T years is T*(1+n)T*(1+g)T; the pension benefit is 
therefore P=T*(1+n)T*(1+g)T/G where G denotes the annuity factor. In the German DB system, 
this average worker earns T earnings points, and during these T years, the average pension 
value PV will increase with the rate of wage growth (g) and the growth rate of the dependency 
ratio (n, if the number of pensioners remains constant): PVT = PV0 *(1+n)T*(1+g)T. Hence, the 
pension benefit is P= T*PV0*(1+n)T*(1+g)T, proportional to the NDC value. Quite ironically, 
therefore, the German DB system comes closer to the idea of a pure NDC system than the 
NDC system implemented in Sweden. 
                                                 
27 Demography enters directly through longevity-dependent annuities, and it bites into the reserve fund. In addi-
tion, Sweden has a re-balancing mechanism once these mechanisms fail (see Settergren, 2001). 
28 See Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003) for details. 
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9.  Conclusions 
The German pension system generated early retirement ages and high replacement rates, but at 
high costs to society in form of a large cost percentage of GDP (about 12 percent) and high 
contribution rates (about 28 percent of gross income, of which 19.5 percent was in direct con-
tributions and 8.5 percent in indirect contributions for state subsidies financed by general 
taxes). In the face of population aging, it was unsustainable: the demographic base for paying 
contributions was shrinking faster than economic growth could compensate for. The implicit 
debt of the system was steeply increasing. 
The threat of financial failure precipitated a 15-year lasting reform process that took several 
steps, with some back and forth. A consistent development can only be constructed in hind-
sight. It produced a “Quasi Notional Defined Contribution” system marketed as a traditional 
defined benefit system. The system has reduced its implicit debt by two-thirds to a manageable 
and sustainable size by conventional public debt standards. It has transformed the monolithic 
pure pay-as-you-go system of the 1960s and 1970s into a multi-pillar system with public, oc-
cupational and individual private pensions. The first pillar will remain dominant with about a 
two-thirds share of total retirement income; voluntary funded pensions have to shoulder the 
remaining third. 
To achieve this conversion, Germany needed two key reforms. The first one was the Riester 
reform in 2001 that reduced the tax and contribution burden by cutting benefits of the PAYG 
pillar and strengthening subsidized or tax-privileged private pensions in individual accounts or 
as occupational pensions. The reform was a historical step toward solving the demographic 
problems confronting the pension system. Its static benefit formula, however, did not succeed 
in stabilizing the public PAYG pillar. 
This instability precipitated the creation of the Sustainability Commission. In contrast to the 
Riester reform, this commission took the political risk of proposing a rise in the normal retire-
ment age and a further reduction in long-term benefits at the same time. As a major innovation, 
this reduction was rationalized by linking benefits to the system dependency ratio. This pro-
vides an automatic stabilizer, hence de facto converted the defined benefit system to a system 
that mimics an NDC system. 
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Future history will tell, whether the 15-year reform process will be a success. With the implicit 
pension debt under control, the eyes are now on retirement income. Maintaining the generous 
retirement income that Germans are used to, depends crucially whether the second and third 
pillars will fill the gap generated by cutting first-pillar benefits. Acceptance of the voluntary 
pensions have risen sharply in the recent three years. This makes optimistic. Acceptance, how-
ever, is not equally distributed. It is high in the upper third of the income distribution, and 
among families with children. The lower third of the income distribution is protected by the 
minimum pension provided through the Riester reform. Hence, there is still considerable work 
to be done to raise acceptance rates in the middle of the income distribution. 
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